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RICO Repercussions: Sedima and Haroco
HAROLD BROWN*
INTRODUCTION
In Sedima, S.R.L. v. Imrex Company, Inc. (Sedima),1 a split
panel of the United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals sus-
tained the dismissal of a private RICO claim.2 It did so on the
ground that the two "predicate acts' 3 required under RICO, had to
consist of prior criminal convictions and that private damages "by
reason of" the violations did not refer to direct injury caused by the
"predicate acts," but by other indirect "racketeering activity."' 4 In
the two following days, another panel adopted Sedima,5 while the
third unwillingly decided that it was controlled by the prior panel
rulings. 6 It also reported that the full circuit bench had rejected en
banc review, with three judges dissenting.
In Haroco Inc. v. American National Bank Trust Co. of Chicago,
(Haroco),7 the Seventh Circuit roundly rejected Sedima. Further, it
stated that its opinion had been circulated among all of its regularly
active judges, but no judge favored a rehearing en banc. One sel-
dom is confronted with such strong disagreement by virtually the
entire judicial complement of two such prestigious circuits. It easily
foreshadowed the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari,8 as well as a
* Mr. Brown is a practicing attorney in Boston, Massachusetts. A.B., Yale Uni-
versity, 1936; J.D., Harvard University School of Law, 1939; LL.M., Harvard Univer-
sity School of Law, 1940; author of seven books on franchising including FRANCHISING:
REALITIES AND REMEDIES, (1981); author of numerous law review articles; and found-
ing member of American Bar Association Forum Committee on Franchising.
1. 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3506 (U.S. Jan. 14,
1985) (No. 84-648).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982), enacted October 15, 1970.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1) (A)-(B) (1982).
4. The private action section of the statute does not contain such language. Its
use is a judicial importation, comparable to the judicially created need for "competi-
tive" injury engrafted onto section 4(a) of the antitrust laws.
5. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984), petition for cert.
filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3367 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1984) (No. 84-657).
6. Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984) petition for cert. filed, (U.S.
1984) (No. 84-604).
7. 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S. Jan. 14,
1985) (No. 84-822).
8. On January 14, 1985, the Supreme Court granted certiorari for Sedima, SPRL
v. Imrex Co., Inc., 741 F.3d 482 (2d Cir. 1984); Haroco v. American Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), while withholding action on the
petitions in Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984); Furman v.
Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984); and Seville Indus. Machinery v. Southwest Ma-
1
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flurry of Congressional and Executive activity.9
This Article will address the rationale applied in both Sedima
and Haroco. Attention will also focus on the interim and long-term
repercussions in the legal community involving other federal cir-
cuits, as well as in the numerous states that have adopted "little"
RICO statutes of their own.10
I. THE RICO STATUTE
Ordinarily, the parsing of a statute is unnecessary. It is, however,
essential for a better understanding of Sedima and Haroco.
Although the act became law in October 1970, almost all of its
court activity has been in criminal process. Civil courts have only
begun to wrestle with its application. The legal community has
therefore had inadequate opportunity to review its terms; to com-
prehend its numerous challenges; and to position itself to use RICO
in standard civil litigation. In general, the statute condemns the
infiltration of a legitimate "enterprise" coupled with abuse through
a "pattern of racketeering activity." The phrase "racketeering ac-
tivity" 1 is substantively defined under "prohibited activity" itself
divided into four separate subsections 12 that hinge on the use of a
"pattern" of racketeering activity.13 The statute then employs an
unusual method of tying together these several operative provisions.
chinery Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1983), petition for cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W.
3449 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1984) (No. 84-879).
9. Senator Strom Thurmond (Republican, South Carolina), Chairman of the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee, stated in October, 1984 that it is "imperative" for Congress to
clarify RICO; the Department of Justice has a task force to consider whether to propose
revisions; and an ABA task force is working on legislative recommendations. See Nat'l
L.J., Jan. 7, 1985, at 18, col. 1.
10. Nineteen State statutes are already modeled on the federal act, with many more
under active consideration. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2312 (1978) (racketeering
injury necessary) (treble damages); CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.2 (a)(17) (west 1983)
(does not especially authorize private suits for damages or equitable relief); COLO. REv.
STAT § 18-17-101 (1981) (treble damages); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-393 (West Supp.
1984) (does not explicitly authorize private suits, but does authorize injunctions); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 895.01 (1982) (treble damages and injunctions); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-
14-1 (1982) (treble damages and injunctions); HAWAH REV. STAT. § 842-1 (1976) (lim-
ited to actual damages); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-30.5-5(b) (treble damages); NEv. REV.
STAT. § 207.4-207.17 (1983) (treble damages); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:41 (West 1982)
(treble damages); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-42-1 (1978) (treble damages); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-06 (1983) (treble damages); OR. REv. STAT. § 166.725(7)(a) (1982) (treble
damages); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 911 (Purdon 1983) (does not expressly authorize
damages); PUERTO Rico LAWS ANN. Tit. 25, § 971 (1978) (does not expressly author-
ize damages); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-15-4(c) (Supp. 1984) (treble damages); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-10-1601 (1981) (treble damages); WASH. REV. CODE § 1-17 and 20 (effective
July 1, 1985) (treble damages); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 946-80 (West Supp. 1982) (punitive
damages), amongst other states currently considering little RICO statutes.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1982).
13. Id., 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
2
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As for "racketeering activity," the statute incorporates by refer-
ence any act or threat "indictable" under any of twenty-four spe-
cific federal offenses as well as eight state crimes that are punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year. The "state crimes" in-
clude "any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, arson, rob-
bery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotics."14 The federal
prohibitions include "any act that is indictable" under a long list of
specified sections in title 18, including such broad categories as mail
or wire fraud, or offenses in title 11 involving fraud connected with
a "bankruptcy" or "fraud in the sale of securities."' 15 Given the
established scope of fraud in the use of the mails, 16 in the sale of
securities,' 7 and that "connected" with bankruptcy, such offenses
can be found in virtually any form of scheme or deception.
The "pattern" of racketeering activity requires proof of two acts
of "racketeering activity" within a ten-year period of each other,
following enactment of RICO on October 15, 1970.18 These defini-
tions are then employed to define the "prohibited activities" that
give rise to both criminal and civil liability.' 9
The congressional thrust in RICO is to "forbid persons from con-
ducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of engaging in
the predicate crimes."' 20 The "enterprise" is broadly defined to in-
clude "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
other legal entity and any union or group of individuals associated
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)A (1982).
15. See 18 U.S.C. 1961(l)(B) (1982). The twenty-four federal crimes include 18
U.S.C. § 201 (bribery); § 224 (sports bribery); § 471-473 (counterfeiting); § 659 (theft
from interstate shipment); § 664 (embezzlement from pension and welfare funds);
§ 891-894 (extortionate credit acts); § 1343 (wire fraud); § 1503 (obstruction of justice);
§ 1510 (obstruction of criminal investigations); § 1511 (obstruction of state or local law
enforcement); § 1951 (racketeering); § 1953 (shipping wagering materials); § 1954 (ille-
gal gambling business); § 2314-15 (interstate transport of stolen property); §§ 2341-46
(trafficking in contraband cigarettes); §§ 2421-24 (white slave traffic); 29 U.S.C. § 186
(payments and loans to labor organizations), § 501(c) (embezzlement of union funds);
plus "any offense involving fraud connected with a (bankruptcy) case" under title II,
"fraud in the sale of securities," or felonious narcotics matters under federal law.
16. See Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771
(1980). While "mail fraud" is extremely broad, "good faith" has always been a defense.
Darland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 314 (1896); United States v. Martin-Trigona,
684 F. 2d 485, 492-93 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Curry, 681 F.2d 406, 417 (5th
Cir. 1982).
17. See A. BROMBERG, SEC RULE 10(B)(5) (1982).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982) (prohibited activities), § 1963 (criminal penalties), and
1964 (civil remedies).
20. See Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1055 n.10 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd and rev'd
in part, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1983) (en bane), including incorporation of the original
panel decision. Other leading civil RICO cases are Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343
(7th Cir. 1983); Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272
(7th Cir. 1983); Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman and Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1982); and
USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1982).
3
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in fact although not a legal entity. ' 21 The term person is defined to
include "any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or bene-
ficial interest in property. '22 The RICO statute focuses on the "in-
filtration" of such "enterprises" as business concerns, labor unions,
or government entities.23
Finally, these are all coordinated in the four provisions which
define "prohibited activities."'24 Wherever a "pattern of racketeer-
ing activity" is involved, it is declared illegal: (1) to "use or invest
income (from such activity); to acquire any interest in, or to estab-
lish or operate, any enterprise that engages in interstate com-
merce;25 or (2) "to acquire or maintain any interest or control" in
such an enterprise;26 or (3) for any person employed or "associated"
with such an enterprise to conduct or participate in such a racke-
teering pattern of activity;27 or (4) for any person to conspire to
violate any of the foregoing subsections.28
The stiff criminal penalties encompass a fine of up to $25,000 or
twenty years imprisonment, or both.29 They go much further to
require the forfeiture to the United States of "any interest . . . ac-
quired or maintained" in violation of one of the "prohibited activi-
ties," as well as "any interest in, security of, claim against, or
property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influ-
ence over any enterprise he has established operated, controlled,
conducted, or participated in the conduct of."' 30 In addition to re-
straining orders, the court is directed to authorize the attorney gen-
eral to seize all forfeited interest or property. 3'
The civil remedies include a full panorama of equitable jurisdic-
tion, speedy trial, a private remedy with treble damages and attor-
neys' fees, and total estoppel effect for a final judgment or decree of
the United States. 32 Venue is granted nation-wide both in criminal
and civil matters. 33 Extremely broad powers are granted to the at-
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982).
23. See generally Blakey & Gettings, Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009
(1980) [hereinafter referred to as Blakey & Gettings]. See also Sedima, 741 F.2d at 489-
94.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1982).
25. Id. § 1962(a)
26. Id. § 1962(b)
27. Id. § 1962(c).
28. Id. § 1962(d).
29. Id. § 1963(a).
30. Id.
31. Id. § 1963(b), 1963(c). See Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296 (1983)
(seizure provision of RICO 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) held constitutional).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982).
33. Id. § 1965. Such venue over corporations and individuals greatly exceeds the
comparable provisions under the antitrusts laws 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1982).
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torney general for civil investigative demands.34 The Seventh Cir-
cuit spoke with more than a modicum of fact when it declared that
the civil RICO provisons are "constructed on the model of a trea-
sure hunt. 35
There are numerous civil RICO issues on which there is substan-
tial disagreement both between and within circuits. For example,
there is no agreement as to whether a "person" may also be the
"enterprise, '3 6 as well as whether the "enterprise" may be both a
claimant and a violator. 37 Another unresolved question is whether
private claimants are entitled to equitable relief either under the au-
thority of the statute or from a court's general equitable
jurisdiction.
Without denigrating the significance of the other federal and
state crimes enumerated in RICO, it is unquestioned that because of
their breadth, the federal mail and wire fraud statutes have occu-
pied the main role.38 It is erroneous, however, to assume that it is
simple to prove the components of these crimes. The mail fraud
statute must be read to include "everything designed to defraud by
representations as to the past or present, or suggestions or promises
as to the future."'39 The act has been employed as a first line of
attack against virtually every new fraudulent scheme invented by
man's ingenuity, at least until such time as specific legislation has
been devised to deal with the newest abuses, ranging through securi-
ties transactions, loan-sharking, land sales, credit cards, drug distri-
bution, franchising, and pyramid sales schemes.40
In a civil proceeding, it is nonetheless necessary to allege and
prove specific intent to defraud in order to obtain money or prop-
erty by fraudulent pretenses or promises, either by devising, partici-
pating in, or abetting the scheme, and by using the mail to carry out
the artifice. While "good faith" is a defense, this is merely the other
side of having to prove fraudulent intent. The fraud must be alleged
with particularity, 4' underscored by the special emphasis on coun-
sel's good faith obligation in signing any pleading or court
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1968 (1982).
35. Sutliffe, Inc. v. Donovan Companies, 727 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1984).
36. See Hirsch v. Enright Ref. Corp., No. 84-5087 slip op. - (3d Cir. Sept. 14
1984) (holding that "person" and "enterprise" must be separate entities, resulting in
reversal of the first civil RICO recovery in federal court after a full trial).
37. See Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1055 (8th Cir. 1982), in which this aspect of the
panel's ruling was rejected in the rehearing en banc, while the panel's view was relied
upon in Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508 (1983).
38. Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
39. Id. at 313-14.
40. See Mr. Chief Justice Burger's dissent in United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395,
405-07 (1974).
41. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) relied upon in Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1055 (8th
Cir. 1982). See also Bender v. Southland Corp., 749 F.2d 1205 (6th Cir. 1984) (RICO
[Vol. 21
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document. 42
Until Sedima, there had been virtually no civil ruling requiring
compliance with the criminal standard of a showing "beyond a rea-
sonable doubt." Almost every court specified proof by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, 4 3 although some support had been shown for
proof "by clear and convincing" evidence.44 Factually, a "scheme"
is adequate if it is calculated to deceive persons of ordinary pru-
dence and comprehension, even though no misrepresentations were
made. It includes all elements of trickery whether in the form of
half-truths or the concealment of material facts, as well as express
misstatements. The "property" may be either tangible or intangible
benefits or rights.45 Finally, the mails must be used either in con-
nection with the accomplishment of the scheme or as a later act to
lull victims. 46
This condensed scanning of RICO and the crime of mail fraud,
serves to dispel the fear that civil recovery under RICO is an open
invitation to converting ordinary business transactions into a bo-
nanza of treble damage recoveries, plus attorneys' fees and costs. It
is against this background that the Sedima-Haroco controversy can
be more keenly appreciated.
II. THE SEDIMA CASE
A. Proceeding in Eastern District of New York
In Sedima, the district court 47 dismissed the complaint because it
failed to allege a "RICO-type injury," as distinguished from busi-
ness fraud.48 Sedima was a Belgian corporate partner in a joint ven-
ture with defendant Imrex Company, Inc., a New York company
mail fraud allegations must include both intent to defraud and damage causation to be
pleaded with particularity under FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b)).
42. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
43. Eaby v. Richmond, 561 F. Supp. 131, 133-34 (E.D. Pa. 1983); State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co. v. Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 676 (N.D. Ind. 1982); Parnes v. Heinhold
Commodities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645, 647 (N.D. Ill. 1980) ("Civil burden of proof");
Heinhold Commodities, Inc. v. McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 311, 313 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Farm-
ers Bank of Del. v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (D. Del. 1978).
44. See Swanson v. Wabash, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1094 (N.D. 11. 1983) (decided Dec.
16, 1983), (citing Matz, Determining the Standard of Proof in Lawsuits Brought Under
RICO, Nat'l L. J. (Oct. 1983) at 21, col. 1 n.51).
45. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v.
Bronston, 658 F. 2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982) (breach of
fiduciary duty, such as theft of "inside" information); United States v. Mandel, 602
F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (political corruption); United States v. Hasenstab,
575 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir. 1978) (commercial fraud).
46. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974); United States v. Kalem, 416 F.2d
346 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 952 (1970).
47. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 963 (D.N.Y 1984).
48. Id. at 964.
6
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owned and controlled by the two individual defendants.49 Sedima's
role was to obtain orders for electronic component parts from a Bel-
gian manufacturer, while Imrex was to place the orders, ship the
goods, and account to Sedima. 50 Sedima claimed that Imrex falsi-
fied purchase prices, costs, and expenses in shipping and financing;
that it thereby misappropriated joint venture funds; and that it vio-
lated RICO, based on mail and wire fraud in the $8.5 million of
orders secured by Sedima and placed through Imrex.51 These alle-
gations brought Imrex and its two owner-executives expressly
within the statutory proscription of "conducting. . .an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering (consisting of two or more uses of
the mail and wire to defraud Sedima) or collection of unlawful debt
(by obtaining money from Sedima through deliberately false pre-
tenses).52 In addition to these two counts, Sedima alleged that the
individuals and Imrex conspired to perform these RICO prohibi-
tions.53 Sedima sought treble damages and reasonable attorneys'
fees. 54
The sole reason for the dismissal by the district court was
Sedima's failure to allege "any injury in this case apart from that
which would result directly from the alleged predicate acts of mail
fraud and wire fraud."55 Relying on a prior Second Circuit opinion,
the court found that Sedima's claims "need not be grounded in alle-
gations that the defendant is affiliated with 'organized crime' " and
that "the racketeering enterprise need not have an economic signifi-
cance apart from the pattern of racketeering activity."'56
The district court made no reference to a requirement that the
"predicate acts" had to be based on prior criminal convictions. No
such claim was made in the district, nor in the circuit courts; and
importantly, neither party filed any briefs on that subject.5 7
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. In addition to other counts alleging such matters as breach of contract and
fiduciary duties, conversion, and constructive trust, Sedima alleged three violations of
RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982), prohibiting any person "to conduct or participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt."
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982), the predicate acts being separate and numerous
violations of the Mail Fraud Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and The Wire Fraud Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d) (1982).
54. Id. § 1964(c). This section provides in pertinent part: "property by reason of a
violation of section 1962 . . .shall recover threefold the damages he sustains etc."
55. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 963 (E.D. N.Y. 1983).
56. Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 20 (2d Cir. 1983).
57. The district court held only that the plaintiffs failed to show they were injured
by anything more than the predicate acts. Sedima, 574 F. Supp. at 965.
[Vol. 21
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B. Second Circuit Court of Appeals
Writing for a split panel, Judge Oakes started with a racy tirade
against the "explosion" of civil RICO litigation, "spawned" by a
broad reading of Professor Blakey's law review article,58 with "spe-
cial credence" deriving from the latter's position as Chief Counsel
to the Senate Subcommittee that proposed RICO.5 9 He said that
such a reading gave federal jurisdiction,60 which allows for the
bypassing of specific remedial schemes, as for securities, with the
additional enticement of treble damages and attorney's fees.61 He
reported that "there is now indeed, a 'RICO bar' among some of
whom it has been found that the stigma associated with the label
'racketeering' is a good settlement weapon." 62
Quoting RICO's declared purpose in "dealing with the unlawful
activities of those engaged in organized crime," he attacked the use
of RICO as "extraordinary, if not outrageous. ' 63 He declared that
RICO "has not proved particularly useful for generating treble
damage actions against mobsters by victimized businesspeople. 64 It
has, instead, led to claims against such respected and legitimate
"'enterprises' as the American Express Co., E.F. Hutton & Co.,
Lloyd's of London, Bear Stearns & Co. and Merrill Lynch, all of
whom are named in published opinions."'6 5
With virtually no foundation, Judge Oakes declared that RICO's
58. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 23. It is surprising that the Court failed to cite
Professor Blakey's very scholarly article on RICO: Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Ac-
tion in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 237 (1982), in
which some of the footnotes exceeded ten to twenty pages.
59. Normally, courts would welcome an article by a law professor, especially one
so intimately involved in the formulation of important legislation.
60. The federal jurisdiction issue is groundless since federal diversity jurisdiction
would obviously exist in many instances such as in Sedima itself. There is some contro-
versy as to whether RICO allows concurrent federal and state jurisdiction. See County
of Cook v. Midcon Corp., 574 F. Supp. 902 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (no concurrent jurisdic-
tion); contra, Luebke v. Marine Nat'l Bank of Neenah, 567 F. Supp. 1460 (E.D. Wis.
1983); Greenveiw Trading Co., Inc. v. Hirschman and Leicher, P.C., N.Y.L.J., Mar. 13,
1984, at 5, col. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 5, 1984).
61. The Securities Acts are not preemptive either expressly or impliedly. There ar
also alternate treble damage remedies under "little" FTC Acts, as in Massachusetts.
(See Hickey v. Howard, 598 F. Supp. 1105 (D. Mass. 1984) (stock "churning" covered
by MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 93A (West 1984) the "little" FTCA) which provides
for up to treble damages and attorneys' fees. (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 9-11 (West
1984).
62. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 487 n.7.
63. Id. at 487.
64. Id. at 487-88.
65. Id. at 487. It is surprising to observe a noted jurist engaging in such sweeping
factual statements for which there is not only no general knowledge, but in the face of
an appellate record completely devoid of such evidence. To the contrary, the Sedima
allegations, if proven, will establish repeated intentionally fraudulent business crimes of
the worst kind; each of them is also amenable to common law or statutory punitive
damages.
8
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terms were "ambiguous," especially in such elements as to the re-
quired burden of proof for civil cases. 66 That "ambiguous lan-
guage" of the statute therefore required construction in the light of
Congress' purpose, particularly since RICO's private action provi-
sion drew upon the exact words of another statute and expressly
demanded "liberal construction. . . to effectuate its remedial pur-
pose."' 67 He declared that this would require a study of its legisla-
tive history to guide the scope of the private civil remedy.68
This transitional paragraph is noteworthy because nothing which
precedes it discloses "ambiguous language." The congressional de-
mand for "liberal construction" can not be fulfilled by emasculating
the express terms of the statute. Also, the congressional record is
very complete in indicating that the statute expressly avoided "sta-
tus" related language due to the impossibility of adequately defining
"organized crime," as well as the severe constitutional doubts im-
plicit in any such declaration of criminality.
These arguments were raised in the Eighth Circuit about one
month after Sedima and its two companion Second Circuit deci-
sions. 69 In the Eighth Circuit case, Alexander Grant & Company v.
Tiffany Industries, Inc., (Grant), an accounting firm was held to
have standing to sue its corporate client for direct injuries from lost
fees, the cost of an SEC investigation, and damage to its financial
reputation arising from the client's manipulation of its financial
records in order to obtain a favorable audit for use in the market
place.
First, Grant distinguished this claim from the lack of standing for
an auditor's indemnification charges. 70 The court then held that
the civil remedy for "any person injured in his business or property
by reason of a violation of section 1962" was based on "language
[that] is unambiguous and conclusive, absent any clearly expressed
legislative intent to the contrary. ' 71 The Eighth Circuit refused to
hold that any requirement of a "racketeering enterprise injury" re-
sembled the "commercial or competitive injury concept" as well as
applicability only to those defendants associated with organized
crime. 72 It stated, "[a] 'racketeering enterprise' injury is a slippery
concept whose definition has eluded even those courts professing to
66. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 487.
67. Id.
68. See discussion, Sedima, 741 F.2d at 488-94.
69. Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Industries, Inc., 742 F.2d 408 (8th Cir.
1984), was decided August 22, 1984, while Sedima was decided July 25, 1984.
70. Cf. Cenco v. Seidman and Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1982) with Grant.
In Grant, the Eighth Circuit also stated that it was "not persuaded by the reasoning
employed in Cenco." 742 F.2d at 411-12.
71. Grant, 742 F.2d at 412.
72. Id. at 413.
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recognize it.' '7 3 Further, it held that both of those limitations had
been rejected in an earlier Eighth Circuit case.74
Besides refuting the elimination of damages resulting "directly"
from the "predicate acts," the Grant court noted the indirect injury
in "increased harm" to the auditing firm through its being fraudu-
lently induced to continue rendering accounting services.75 In so
doing, it briefly referred to Sedima and its two companion deci-
sions, declaring that the Eighth Circuit does not require "that the
injury result from mobster activity or the efforts of organized
crime," as mandated in Sedima; that the Grant decision comports
with the holding in Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades (Bankers Trust)
though the latter is "far narrower"; and that the "prior criminal
conviction" holding of Sedima had not been raised in the Grant
district court, perhaps chiding the Sedima court for its unwarranted
appellate intrusion on an issue not before it.76
In Sedima, Judge Oakes then embarked on a ten page search of
RICO's legislative history, doing so entirely on his own and without
the benefit of adverse parties' claims or briefing. 77 While he demon-
strated that the private civil claim was proposed late in an otherwise
lengthy congressional process, his use of that sparse record was to-
tally inadequate to support his two conclusions, namely, that "Con-
gress was not aware of the possible implications of section 1964(c)
• . . [or it] would at least have discussed it," and that "the clanging
silence [sic] of the legislative history, coupled with the section's use
in areas far afield from the battle against organized crime" have led
to a variety of judicial limitations. 78
This premise is manifestly erroneous on several grounds. First,
where there is plain and clear language, the legislative history is, at
best, a problematic tool of interpretation. Then declaring that Con-
gress did not know what it was doing, Judge Oakes personally as-
sumed the role of deciding what Congress would have intended if it
had properly addressed its task. Such unsolicited "activism" has
been at the core of attacks on judicial wandering from a court's
constitutional constraints. It has been firmly established that such
judicial meandering is unprofessional and unwise.
Having determined that severe limitations on private civil actions
73. Id.
74. 685 F.2d 1055 (8th Cir. 1982).
75. Grant, 742 F.2d at 413.
76. Id. at 413-14. The Grant court stated: "The Second Circuit recently held...
that the 'by reason of' language in section 1964(c) requires that the injury results from
• . . organized crimes. As indicated previously, this requirement is contrary to our
holding in Bennett." Id. at 413.
77. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 488-94.
78. Id. at 492.
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were therefore mandated, the court proceeded to discuss the four
principal tasks taken by some courts and widely rejected by others.
In singling out these four limitations, Judge Oakes predictably set
the course for his two ultimate fiats.
The first, requiring some nexus with "organized crime," had al-
ready been rejected by the Second Circuit, as well as by almost
every other appellate tribunal.79 With equal celerity, the Court dis-
posed of the need to allege "competitive" or "racketeering in-
jury."' 80 This left for discussion, first, the question "whether the
injury complained of must result from 'enterprise' involvement in
the racketeering, rather than directly form the activity itself' and
second, "whether there must be criminal convictions from the pred-
icate acts underlying a civil RICO suit."'81
Having narrowed the field to these two "strawmen," Judge Oakes
first sought to eliminate any suggestion that the Supreme Court had
decided either of these issues.8 2 He asserted that its leading decision
on criminal application of RICO did not address either question,
except for the inverse conclusion that the existence of the civil rem-
edies did not limit the scope of the criminal provision. 83 On that
tenuous ground, the Second Circuit held that when the Supreme
Court called for reliance on the clear and express language of the
statute itself, plus the congressional direction of "liberal construc-
tion," it did so "only (sic)" as to the "balance between federal and
state enforcement of criminal law," and not with regard to the in-
tended scope of the private civil remedy.84 What every other circuit
court has repeatedly cited as guidance for RICO's interpretation,
was thus set aside by Judge Oakes in favor of his own resolution of
the "very real ambiguities . . . surrounding the complex statutory
scheme providing for the private civil remedy."' 85 He relied on a
single district case for such authority. 86 As an afterthought, the
court simply footnoted the latest and most important Supreme
Court RICO decision in which it held that the RICO seizure provi-
79. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983). See also Sedima,
741 F.2d at 493 n.32, wherein the court lists numerous cases rejecting the organized
crime nexus.
80. See Sedima, 741 F.2d at 493 nn.33-35 for a long list of citations (1) requiring a
showing of q "competitive" injury or a "racketeering enterprise injury; and (2) refusing
to impose limitations on RICO claimants.
81. Id. at 494-504.
82. Id.
83. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981).
84. Id. at 493.
85. Id. at 494.
86. Authority for a narrow reading of the private civil remedy was found in a dic-
tum of Harper v. New Japan Securities International, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1005, 1006
(C.D. Cal 1982).
[V/ol. 21
11
Brown: RICO Repercussions: Sedima and Haroco
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1984
1985] RICO REPERCUSSIONS: SEDIMA & HAROCO 293
sions are constitutional. 7 Judge Oakes simply footnoted that in
that decision, the Supreme Court had once again rejected a "narrow
reading" of RICO's criminal, rather than its civil provisions. 88 In
so doing, he ignored the common law principle of interpretation
requiring stricter construction of a statute's criminal provisions, as
compared with that employed for its civil remedies. 89 That general
concept was fortified by the express congressional mandate of lib-
eral construction for RICO, with no confinement of its use in crimi-
nal prosecutions.90
In spite of the foregoing shortcomings, the discussion of "racke-
teering injury" relied on a carefully constructed analogy. Judge
Oakes correctly reported that the "by reason of" phrase had been
copied from section 4(a) of the antitrust laws; that the Supreme
Court had imported the restriction of that broad language to the
"competitive" conduct which was substantively prohibited; 91 that,
by analogy, a RICO injury had to be of the "racketeering" variety;
and that in order not to be redundant, it had to "cause systemic
harm to competition and the market, and thereby injure investors
and competitors."'92 At the same time, the court expressly said that
this does not mean that "standing to sue under RICO should be
limited only to people who have standing to sue for competitive in-
jury under the antitrust laws."' 93 Evidently recognizing that he had
been trapped by his own reasoning, Judge Oakes then shifted to the
requirement "that the plaintiff show injury different in kind from
that occurring as a result of the predicate acts themselves, or not
simply caused by the predicate acts, but also caused by an activity
which RICO was designed to deter."'94
Aside from this "slippery concept" rejected by the Eighth Circuit
in Grant, it should be noted that Judge Oakes shifted from the defi-
cient allegations ruled upon by the district court in a motion to dis-
miss. In its place, he found an inadequate "showing" that could
only be raised by a motion for summary judgment or after an actual
trial. This distinction was particularly important where an appel-
late court found extreme difficulty in formulating a coherent legal
87. See Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296, 300 (1983).
88. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 494 n.36.
89. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978), distin-
guishing the standard for "intent" in criminal proceedings under the Antitrust Laws, as
contrasted with the principles used in civil proceedings under the identical statutory
language.
90. In Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296, 302-03 (1983), the Court con-
cluded that Congress intended RICO to be liberally construed in civil as well as crimi-
nal cases.
91. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
92. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 496.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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standard and where the relevant circumstances could only be dis-
cerned in a fully developed factual record, buttressed by adversarial
claims and legal argument. None of these were before Judge Oakes.
This fundamental error should be compared with Haroco's treat-
ment of "pleading" versus "proof. 95
The most noteworthy holding of Sedima was its requirement that
the two "predicate acts" required two prior criminal convictions.9 6
In obvious recognition of its radical departure from RICO's judicial
treatment elsewhere, the court stepped away from its earlier poetic
language and cavalier approach. Instead, it turned to the most me-
ticulous analysis of which it was capable. This included deference
to other appellate treatment, together with a parsing of the statutes'
"language" and "intent," and culminating in a summary of the total
composite of its opinion.9 7
First, the court expressly recognized that a private civil suit
under RICO does not require a prior government conviction for a
RICO violation.98 Further, it used contrived distinctions of the two
leading cases to support its own proposition. It claimed that the
first case, United States v. Cappetto99 only confirmed the govern-
ment's right to obtain RICO injunctive relief without a prior RICO
conviction. The second leading case, Farmer's Bank of Delaware v.
Bell Mortgage Corp., °0 required no prior criminal conviction and
allowed proof for private RICO by a simple preponderance of the
evidence, but its only authority was Cappetto.10 Both of these
holdings are tempered by the government's guidelines for
prosecutorial discretion in order to protect against RICO. 102 No
such restraint exists for private suits. A third authority was
USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc.,103 where the Sixth Cir-
cuit allegedly confused the lack of a need for a prior RICO criminal
conviction with the issue of prior criminal convictions for the two
predicate acts. 04
95. The Haroco court stated:
To establish its case at trial, a civil plaintiff must surely prove the acts of
racketeering, but the district courts in Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc. v.
Tracy Collins Bank & Trust Co., 558 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Utah 1983) and Tay-
lor appear to have moved that requirement up to the pleadings stage. For
several reasons, we do not agree that such specificity is required at the plead-
ings stage.
747 F.2d 384, 404.
96. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 496-504.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 496.
99. 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
100. 452 F. Supp. 1278, (D. Del. 1978).
101. Id. at 1280.
102. 502 F.2d at 1355.
103. 689 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1982).
104. Id. at 95 n.l.
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Finally arriving at statutory review, it first approached the "lan-
guage," conceding this to be the "proper place to begin analysis,"
while leaving one to wonder why it took three quarters of the opin-
ion to reach the obvious.10 5 The court scoured RICO for any lan-
guage that varied from the antitrust model.'0 6 It seized on the
single word "violation" in section 1962, blowing this into the "sug-
gestion" that Congress specifically intended to require prior "con-
viction, at least of the predicate acts."107 It had more difficulty in
disposing of the plain meaning of the statutory words "indictable"
and "chargeable."'' 0 8 Judge Oakes was "shocked" that Congress
might have ignored the need to show criminal willfulness, as well as
the panorama of constitutional safeguards for those criminally
charged. 0 9 He argued that if the civil claim need only to be proven
by a preponderance of the evidence, there could be a dangerous
shift of responsibility away from a grand jury or a government pros-
ecutor, making a private claimant his own "one-person grand jury"
accusing a civil defendant of infamous misconduct. 10
Probing congressional intent, the court found other support for
its unique interpretation, admitting that the ambiguities of the stat-
utory language could go the other way.1 ' Here, the court simply
declared that RICO was designed "to provide new penalties and
remedies to combat conduct which explicitly was already found
criminal."' 12 It opted for this conclusion since in a broad reading,
"problems are created of which there is no indication that Congress
ever dreamed."'' 3 The first was the asserted incongruity of any
standard of proof other than that beyond a reasonable doubt to es-
tablish criminality, even through clear and convincing evidence.114
This was buttressed by the "mystery" of alleged "probable cause."
He stated that if varying standards of proof had to be employed, it
would be extraordinarily difficult for juries to understand and ap-
ply. Since Congress apparently anticipated the civil burden of
proof, it must have assumed two "prior convictions." Judge Oakes
therefore concluded that the "liberal construction" mandated by
the statute, violates the due process requirement of strict construc-
105. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 498.
106. Id. at 498-499.
107. Id. at 498.
108. Id. at 499.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 500.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 501.
114. Id.
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tion of criminal statutes. 1 5 The Court confirmed its disbelief of any
other interpretation by reciting each of the individual points that
had been unconvincingly urged throughout the opinion. It then de-
manded that if Congress otherwise intended, "we will (sic) require
more explicit language from Congress indicative of such intent."11 6
In cogent terms in his dissenting opinion, Judge Cardamone dis-
agreed with virtually every argument advanced by the panel major-
ity.1 17 He stressed the need for reliance on plain meaning; the
absence of policy reasons to ignore statutory language; and the inva-
sion of an area reserved for Congress.11 8 With regard to the need
for a "prior conviction," he was especially critical of the sweeping
disapproval of uniform prior authority; the plain meaning of "in-
dictable" and "chargeable"; the raising of constitutional doubts for
a "quasi-criminal" statute; the fear of stigmatizing defendants 'in
civil actions; and hanging this radical departure on the single use of
the word "violation" in section 1964 of RICO. 119
Undoubtedly, the strongest of these was the clear congressional
intent to compensate victims of racketeering activity and to en-
courage them to vindicate their rights. As "private attorneys gen-
eral," civil RICO plaintiffs aid in the eradication of such activity.
To require two prior criminal convictions of predicate acts would,
in essence, wipe out this fundamental congressional purpose, with-
out any clear indication that such debilitation was intended.1 20
In the second part of the dissent, equally forceful arguments were
posed against the requirement of "racketeering injury."1 21 Besides
its widespread rejection by other courts, the phrase provides little or
no guidance. Further, it would bar recovery for direct injury from
fraud, while compensating only those indirectly impacted. Con-
gress could hardly have intended such a result and the syllogism is
condemned in the enforcement of the antitrust laws. Congress con-
sciously chose a broad remedy in order to stamp out mobster activ-
ity, encouraging private litigants to contribute their support. These
restrictions would emasculate the congressional grand scheme of
enforcement.122 In addition to his remarks in this dissent, Judge
115. Id. Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112 (1979). The court also cited
Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REv. 291, 309 (1983), raising this very dilemma.
116. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 504.
117. See generally Sedima, 741 F.2d at 504-08.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 505. The Court stated: "Ordinarily more, not less, protection is ex-
pected for a defendant when the government is plaintiff. When the plaintiff is a private
party. . . the quick dismissal of Capetto totally ignores the 'private attorney general'
rationale built into RICO."
121. Id. at 508-10.
122. Id. at 510.
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Cardamone expanded his criticism in one of the Sedima companion
cases, Furman v. Cirrito, 23 disclosing that prior to publication, a
majority of the sitting judges had voted against a rehearing en bane.
III. THE HAROCO CASE
The Seventh Circuit directly contested the holdings of Sedima
and its sister decisions, expressly noting that not a single sitting
judge voted for reconsideration of Haroco en banc. 124 The district
court dismissed for failure to allege RICO injury beyond the direct
losses caused by the mail fraud.1 25 The claimants asserted that they
had borrowed large sums of money from the defendant bank, based
on a stated relation to the so-called prime rate used for borrowing
by the bank's best customers. The only damage arose from the ex-
tra costs which were directly caused by the alleged falsity of the
defendants' statements as to the prime rate. 26
As for the section 1964 (c) claim here asserted, the circuit court
segregated the issue of "racketeering injury" from the basic statu-
tory requirements of a defendant's "employment or association"
with an "enterprise" in or affecting interstate commerce, by con-
duct of the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity, based on two or more "predicate acts." 127 The court noted
the Second Circuit's Sedima trilogy, as compared with several op-
posite rulings by other circuits. 28 Since both views claimed to rely
on the plain statutory language, more analysis was required.
Aside from the widespread failure to define "racketeering enter-
prise injury" by those courts that have adopted it, the Eighth Cir-
cuit had also considered it a "slippery concept," 129 while those that
have rejected it have expressly remarked on the lack of explanation
and the difficulty of definition as major reasons for its rejection. 30
Since the recent Second Circuit trilogy relied on an "amalgamation
of proposed limits on RICO that [it] rejected in Schacht v. Brown
(Schacht),"'131 the Haroco court declined to follow its rulings.' 3 2
The Haroco court relied on the very expansive public policies ex-
pressly approved by the Supreme Court in United States v.
123. 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984).
124. 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984). The district court cite is Haroco, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 577 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
125. Haroco, 577 F. Supp. at 114.
126. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 385.
127. Id. at 387.
128. Id. at 388-89.
129. See Grant, 742 F.2d at 413.
130. For an excellent example, see In re Catanella & E.F. Hutton & Co., Securities
Litigation, 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1436-37 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
131. 711 F.2d 1343 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508, 509 (1983).
132. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 388.
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Turkette133 and relied upon in Schacht. 3 4 Those courts reaffirmed
Congress' full knowledge of what it was doing to assault a problem
of national dimensions in which prior federal and state process had
failed, thereby denying courts the authority to restrict RICO's ap-
plication. In spite of sparse legislative history, Congress "chose
civil remedies for an enormous variety of conduct, balancing the
need to redress a broad social ill against the virtues of tight, but
possibly overly stringent, legislative draftsmanship."1 35 Further,
Congress had expressly foreclosed the use of a "principled crite-
rion" to circumscribe RICO by its express rejection of: (1) refer-
ences to "organized crime"; (2) the need to show competitive
impact, as against its deliberate intent to go much further in RICO;
and (3) restricting recovery to those who are "indirect" victims of
racketeering activity. 136 Such limitations would impugn Congress'
attack on the sources of organized crime's economic power 37 by
separating racketeers from their profits. If restricted to direct dam-
ages, victims could not recover their major contributions to the
racketeers' profits.138 While rejecting the Sedima trilogy, the
Haroco court felt impelled to update its own analysis.
The Court carefully parsed each factual and legal step in
Sedima's conclusion that "racketeering injury" was required. The
overall opinion was that Sedima had revived the discredited organ-
ized crime nexus by requiring allegation of injury "from mobster
activity or the efforts of organized crime." Sedima expressed its
"shock and dismay" that RICO allegations have labeled as racke-
teers legitimate enterprises. 139 To this, Haroco quoted Judge Pratt
in Furman v. Cirrito: "It seems almost too obvious to require state-
ment, but fraud is fraud, whether it is committed by a hit man for
organized crime or by the president of a Wall Street brokerage
firm.,,140
While Schacht refused to restrict recovery to injury from "organ-
ized crime," Sedima chose that course, though it used the compari-
son word "racketeering." Sedima focused on "competitive," plus
some vaguely "other" indirect injury, both of which were also re-
jected by Schacht.141 "Systemic harm to competition" is, therefore,
indistinguishable, while it also fails to aid the direct victims of rack-
133. 452 U.S. 576, 586-587 (1981).
134. Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1353.
135. Id. at 1354-55.
136. Id. at 1358.
137. Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296, 302-303 (1983).
138. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 392.
139. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
140. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 395 n.14 (citing, Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 529 (2d
Cir. 1984)).
141. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 495-96.
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eteering. There is no valid distinction between injury from a "pat-
tern" of predatory acts and direct injury from those acts. Haroco
also noted the inconsistency of Second Circuit rulings in Bankers
Trust and Sedima, the former going further by adopting a meaning-
less "but for" test that would have excluded the primary victims of
the predatory acts in Schacht. If accepted, Bankers Trust would
"reduce RICO's civil provisions to a trivial remedy, available in
only a tiny fraction of RICO violations and dependent upon entirely
fortuitous facts."' 142  The Haroco court also noted Judge
Cardamone's decrying in Bankers Trust that if civil RICO provided
no remedy "on the facts of this totally outrageous case, it never
will."1' 43
While therefore adhering to its Schacht conclusion that a civil
RICO plaintiff need neither allege nor prove more than direct in-
jury, it reaffirmed that the phrase "by reason of" required proof of
causation of injury, either directly or indirectly, by the "charge-
able" criminal conduct.
It concluded by stressing the fundamental conflicts between
Schacht and Sedima. The Seventh Circuit found RICO "not am-
biguous," but "deliberately and extraordinarily broad," thereby ac-
counting for its sometime unusual applications. Congress
deliberately chose broad terms for conduct and participation that
would defy judicial confinement. 144 While Congress may not have
anticipated the results, it was Congress that preferred breadth to
precision. Courts cannot impose special standing and injury re-
quirements where Congress was neither careless nor inartful, it be-
ing exclusively for Congress to alter legislation. 14 It concluded
that "particularly at the pleading stage," the court should not chal-
lenge explicit congressional policies in the face of much smaller
stakes such as "legal fees and the sensibilities of prominent defend-
ants alleged to be racketeers."' 146
Pursuant to these broad purposes, Haroco also proceeded to de-
fine the various roles that an "enterprise" could perform, such as
"victim, prize, instrument, or perpetrator," relying on Professor
Blakey's article. 147 The court expressly rejected a requirement that
a victim must both allege and prove in his complaint the probable
142. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 398.
143. Bankers Trust, 741 F.2d at 518. The Haroco court noted that "the plaintiff in
Bankers Trust had already proven a substantial portion of its allegations in other court
proceedings. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 398 n.15.
144. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 398.
145. Id. at 398-99.
146. Id. at 399.
147. Id. at 399-400 (citing, Blakey, The Civil RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context:
Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 307-25 (1982)).
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cause aspect of the crimes specified as the two predicate acts. 148 It
declined to decide on a bare record the nature of the burden of
proof, while noting that in civil matters, this is usually achieved by
a preponderance of the evidence. 149 For the "particularity" re-
quired by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
court found adequate the "fair notice" standard as to the transac-
tions, the scheme, the time and the place. 150
CONCLUSION
Given the breadth of choices and the serious policy issues in-
volved in the conflict between Sedima and Haroco, predictions may
not serve a valid purpose. It is relevant to note that all of the courts
share the public policy goals underlying RICO, but that they differ
radically in the application of the civil remedy. In balance, the
scales appear to favor the Haroco court, joined by Judge
Cardamone's dissent in the Sedima trilogy.
In the meantime, litigants are confronted with some unusual pro-
cedural challenges. Where venue is limited to the Second Circuit,
plaintiffs should be cautioned on the need to include civil RICO
counts. Though they may either be dismissed or suspended pending
Supreme Court action on Sedima, failure to do so may raise grave
issues under the time barriers of the applicable Statutes of
Limitations.
Alternatively, given the high mobility and national character of
much of the nation's business activity, claimants may have access to
more than one choice of venue, with the Seventh or Eighth Circuits
obviously providing high attraction. RICO materially contributes
to such litigation by its generous nationwide grant of personal juris-
diction over both individuals and corporations. There are other im-
portant choices, including resort to the "little" RICO statutes in
half of the states. While the application of such statutes may be
somewhat guided by federal court rulings, some important state ju-
risprudence has already demonstrated independence.' 5 1
It is fair to predict that Congress will initiate preliminary hear-
ings. It is, however, unlikely that definitive legislative action will
occur prior to the Supreme Court's ruling on Sedima and Haroco.
RICO has had remarkable success in challenging organized crime.
148. Id. at 404.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 405.
151. See, e.g., State of Arizona v. Pickrel, 667 P.2d 1304 (Ariz. 1983) in which the
state supreme court declared that Arizona's RICO statute cannot raise the question of
federalizing "garden variety" fraud. In veiw of its express approval of liberal construc-
tion of the statute, it is very doubtful that it would accept the narrow reading of Sedima,
regardless of its interpretation by the United States Supreme Court.
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So long as the statute is fulfilling its purpose better than any prior
mechanism, it is unlikely that Congress will tamper with such a
favorable record.
As with many other statutes that are imbued with strong public
policy, it is essential to employ every means available to eradicate
racketeering evils. Since the government has a limited capacity to
obtain compliance, it is especially important to encourage private
attack through the mandatory award of treble damages, plus the
assessment of counsel's fees. In this way, at least some of the vic-
tims of criminal conduct may recover monetary damages for their
suffering. The Congressional mandate of a private remedy would
become virtually meaningless if the "predicate acts" required prior
criminal conviction or if civil damages were either limited to or trig-
gered solely by recovery for "indirect" injury. 152 A fair and plain
reading of RICO abundantly establishes that Congress did not favor
either of these contrived limitations.
152. The Supreme Court has construed the antitrust laws to prohibit recovery by
"indirect" purchasers, noting the serious difficulty in separately quantifying the value of
their damages, plus the probability that indirect claimants are unlikely to bring suit.
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745-46 (1977). See J. Truett Payne Co., Inc.
v. Chrysler Motors, Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 565 (1981) (in order to satisfy the broad public
policy of the antitrust laws, more leniency is allowable for proof of causation of some
competitive harm, as well as for the amount of damages, based on the need to preclude
the violator from gaining any benefit from his misfeasance).
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